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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves a 1997 agreement by the State of Idaho (through the Idaho Department 
of Fish and Game) that Idaho domestic sheep operators would be protected economically from 
any harmful impacts arising from the reintroduction of bighorn sheep into Hells Canyon in 1997. 
Domestic sheep operators are now being forced out of business because of effects arising out of 
the reintroduction of the bighorn sheep and the Department of Fish and Game has ignored its 
1997 promise and the related Idaho statute. The domestic sheep operators filed an Amended 
Complaint seeking to hold the State to its agreement and the State moved to dismiss the action. 
The district court agreed with the State and granted the State's motion to dismiss. This appeal 
follows. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The domestic sheep operators filed their original Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
on April 1, 2010. (R., p. 1). They then filed a First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial on April 20, 2010. (R., p. 9). The Idaho Department ofFish and Game ("IDFG") then 
moved to dismiss on May 19,2010. (R., p. 20). After briefing and a hearing on November 10, 
2010, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order granting IDFG's motion to 
dismiss on February 4,2011. (R., p. 171). Judgment was entered March 4, 2011 (R., p. 191) and 
the Notice of Appeal was timely filed on April 15,2011. (R., p. 202). 
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c. Statement of Facts. 
Since the district court was deciding a motion to dismiss, the facts pleaded in the First 
Amended Complaint are taken as true. See Hoffer v. City of Boise, __ Idaho ___ , 2011 
W.L. 2673285 *1 (July 11, 2011) (since dealing with 12(b)(6) motion "the facts are presented 
here as alleged in his complaint"). The appellant, Idaho Wool Growers' Association, Inc. 
("IWGA") is a non-profit Idaho association. The other appellants are Idaho domestic sheep 
operators and members of IWGA who have grazed sheep in the Payette National Forest for many 
years. (R., p.1O). Appellants are together referred to as "Woolgrowers." 
Bighorn sheep were extirpated from the Hells Canyon area of Idaho and Oregon by the 
mid-1940s. In 1996 and 1997, various federal and state agencies, including the Idaho 
Department of Fish and Game, joined together to consider the reintroduction of the bighorn 
sheep in the Hells Canyon area. (R., p.ll). During this time period, IWGA and its members 
became concerned about the reintroduction plan and feared it would harm their sheep operations. 
They threatened to oppose the reintroduction plan and threatened to seek legislation in the Idaho 
Legislature. As a result of the threatened opposition from IWGA and its members and in an 
effort to resolve the dispute and eliminate these objections and the Woolgrowers' resistance to 
the introduction of the bighorn sheep, the governmental entities of the Hells Canyon Bighorn 
Sheep Restoration Committee, including the United States Forest Service, Washington and 
Oregon wildlife agencies and the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, signed a Letter 
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Agreement addressed to the IWGA. (R., p.12). (A copy of that Letter Agreement is located at 
R., pp. 197-98.) 
The Letter Agreement dated January 16, 1997 stated that the Idaho Department of Fish 
and Game and the other state wildlife agencies "will also take whatever action is necessary to 
reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep 
operators." (emphasis added) The Hells Canyon Bighorn Sheep Restoration Committee, of 
which IDFG was a member, also "recognizes the existing domestic sheep operations in or 
adjacent to the Hells Canyon complex, on both National Forest and private lands .... " As a 
result of the execution of the Letter Agreement, IWGA and its members, understanding that the 
intent of the Letter Agreement was that domestic sheep operators not only would not be held 
responsible for losses of bighorn sheep but that IDFG would take whatever action was necessary 
so that domestic sheep operators would not be harmed as a result of the reintroduction of the 
bighorn sheep, withdrew their opposition to the reintroduction of the bighorn sheep and ceased 
legislative action to prohibit IDFG from participating in the program. (R., p.13). 
As a result of the agreement between IDFG and the domestic sheep operators, and 
consistent with the January 1997 Letter Agreement, two months later on March 24, 1997 the 
Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D), which among other things required that 
IDFG give notice of bighorn sheep transplants to any affected Federal grazing permittees and 
also stated that the existing domestic sheep operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep 
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transplant "are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of 
bighorn sheep when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted." 
For several years all parties to the Letter Agreement honored their deal and the statute 
was followed. Starting around April 2007, however, various Woolgrowers began to suffer 
economic harm as a direct result of the introduction of the bighorn sheep. This harm included 
reductions in Federal domestic sheep grazing permits because of claimed losses of bighorn sheep 
due to domestic sheep. Specifically in 2007 (as well as in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011), the 
United States Forest Service took action to modify the grazing permits held by several of the 
members of lWGA and reduced domestic sheep grazing on allotments in order to prevent the 
alleged transmission of diseases from domestic sheep to bighorn sheep. Western Watersheds 
Project v. U.S. Forest Service, 2007 WL 1430734, at *1 (D. Idaho 2007); see also Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, at R., p. 32. Those members appealed the 
administrative decision to the Federal District Court which concluded that "given the evidence of 
disease transmission between domestic sheep and bighorns, and the past failure to separate 
bighorns from domestic sheep on the Shirts' allotments, the Forest Service had sufficient reason 
to adopt a 'different approach' to 'more strictly limit grazing on that allotment.'" Western 
Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Service, 2007 WL 1430734 at *1 (D. Idaho 2007); see also 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at R., p. 32. Therefore, as 
determined by the Federal Court, the basis for the reduction in grazing rights was evidence of 
disease transmission which the 1997 Letter Agreement had stated would not be the basis for 
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economic harm to the Woolgrowers and which the 1997 Idaho statute had "accepted" when 
recognizing the existing domestic sheep operations in the area. See also 1997 Letter Agreement 
(wherein IDFG and the other state wildlife agencies also "will assume the responsibility for 
bighorn losses and further disease transmission in their states."). 
In response to this harm, the IDFG stood by and refused to take "whatever action that is 
necessary" to reduce these losses to bighorn sheep without adversely impacting the existing 
domestic sheep operations. The 1997 Letter Agreement did not identify the type of action that 
would be necessary. However, the actions could have included, but were not limited to, 
managing bighorn sheep in a manner that would negate conflict with domestic sheep operations 
(which could have included relocation of the bighorns), providing alternatives to domestic sheep 
operations to negate losses to bighorn sheep which could have included alternative forage 
sources, or providing recompense to the Woolgrowers. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in granting IDFG's motion to dismiss the Woolgrowers' 
Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim? 
2. Did the district court err in dismissing the Woolgrowers' claim for breach of 
contract in a 12(b)(6) motion? 
3. Was the district court's statement in dicta that the 1997 Letter Agreement is void 
as a matter of law in error? 
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4. Did the district court err in the finding that the Woolgrowers' claim for violation 
of statute fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted? 
5. Did the district court err in dismissing all of the Woolgrowers' estoppel claims on 
a 12(b )(6) motion to dismiss? 
6. Are the Woolgrowers entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under Idaho Code § 
12-117? 
III. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint on a Motion to 
Dismiss. 
There is a high threshold for granting a 12(b)(6) motion. The court should make "every 
reasonable intendment" in order "sustain a complaint against a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim." Idaho Commission on Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 217, 506 P.2d 
112, 114 (1973). The court looks no further than the pleadings when ruling on a motion to 
dismiss. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). The issue is 
not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer 
evidence to support the claim. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960,962, 895 P.2d 561, 
563 (1995), cited in Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Kootenai, ____ P.3d ___ _ 
2011 WL 2652475 (Idaho 2011). In the present case, the district court appeared to 
misunderstand the difference between a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment and a Rule 
12(b )(6) motion to dismiss. In its Memorandum Decision (R., p. 176) it stated that "in deciding 
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a motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, the district court applies the same standards applied to a 
motion for summary judgment. Lasser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)." The 
portion of Lasser cited by the district court applies to appellate review of a lower court's decision 
dismissing an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and does not state the standard of review to be 
applied by the lower court itself when reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion. The only question before 
the lower court should be whether a claim for relief has been stated by the pleadings. See £osser, 
145 Idaho at 673, 183 P.3d at 761. 
The standard for appellate review is also clear. "[AJ district court's dismissal of a 
complaint under I.R.c.P. 12(b)(6) shall be reviewed de novo." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 
826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010). "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss for a failure 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the question is whether the non-movant has 
alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim which, if true, would entitle him to relief." 
Rincover v. State of Idaho, 128 Idaho 653, 656 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996). 
B. The Wooigrowers Have Stated a Claim for Breach of Contract. 
The Amended Complaint alleges that in exchange for the Woolgrowers' agreement to 
withdraw their opposition to the bighorn sheep introduction and forbear from political action and 
lobbying for Idaho legislative repudiation of the reintroduction project, the IDFG entered into the 
Letter Agreement of 1997. The Amended Complaint alleges that the Letter Agreement obligates 
IDFG to protect the Wool growers from economic harm occurring because of the introduction of 
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the bighorn sheep into the domestic sheep operators' traditional grazing areas. The Amended 
Complaint alleges that this contract was in effect for several years but then was breached by 
IDFG when it refused to protect the Wool growers from the effects of the bighorn sheep 
reintroduction (particularly the loss of grazing rights) by refusing to take action to reduce the loss 
of sheep or to compensate the Woolgrowers for their economic losses. 
The Amended Complaint therefore alleges an agreement, consideration, breach of the 
agreement and resulting damages. That is all that is necessary to allege in order to assert a 
breach of contract cause of action. Moreover, as the Memorandum Decision notes, the 
Defendants made a concession that the 1997 letter was to be treated as an agreement for purposes 
of the Motion to Dismiss argument. (R., p.174). 
The district court failed to recognize that whether a contract was formed is a question of 
fact. Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 113, 204 P.3d 1114, 1124 (2009). The Woolgrowers 
allege that the consideration for the contract was their forbearance from opposing the 
reintroduction. Idaho law recognizes that "forbearance from exercising a right - such as the right 
to resort to courts to settle a dispute - in exchange for a promise to pay money constitutes 
consideration." McColm-Traska v. Valley View, Inc., 138 Idaho 497, 502, 65 P.3d 519, 524 
(2003). "A promisee's bargained-for action or forbearance, given in exchange for a promise, 
constitutes consideration." /d. at 501, 65 P.3d at 523. The Woolgrowers also assert that there 
was a meeting of the minds and a common understanding as evidenced by the Letter Agreement, 
the actions of both sides, and the mutual intent of the parties. See Heritage Excavation, Inc. v. 
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Briscoe, 141 Idaho 40, 43, 105 P.3d 700, 703 (CLApp. 2005). "The common and distinct 
understanding may be express or implied." Fox v. Mountain West Elec. Ins. 137 Idaho 703, 707, 
52 P.3d 848, 832 (2002). The manifestation of mutual intent to contract by the Wool growers and 
IDFG is evidenced by the Letter Agreement from IDFG which was directed specifically to the 
Executive Director of the Idaho Wool Growers Association. 
This was all that the Woolgrowers needed to point to survive a motion to dismiss. The 
district court appeared to concede that there was a contract but then proceeded to interpret the 
terms of the contract. That may be appropriate in a motion for summary judgment where the 
parties can present evidence and argue over appropriate interpretation of the contractual terms; it 
is not appropriate in a motion to dismiss where the issue was never properly presented and the 
relevant evidence was not allowed in. 
If this Court does consider the substance of the contract involved, its review is de novo. 
Taylor, 149 Idaho at 832, 243 P.3d at 648. The Woolgrowers assert that the language in the 
Letter Agreement supports their arguments or at the least is ambiguous such that the factfinder 
would be required to hear evidence as to the intent of the parties, with the ambiguities construed 
against the IDFG which participated in the drafting of the document. While the Woolgrowers 
assert that consideration of the substance of the agreement is inappropriate on a motion to 
dismiss, they would point out that the signatories to the Letter Agreement not only "recognized" 
existing domestic sheep operations around Hells Canyon on both National Forest and private 
land, but also "accepted" the risk of disease transmission and the state wildlife agencies, 
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including specifically IDFG, agreed to "take whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses 
of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep operators." (R., p.197). 
Contrary to the district court's position, the Woolgrowers do not assert that the contract was 
breached because IDFG failed to prevent the Forest Service from modifying the existing grazing 
allotments; rather, the Wool growers assert that IDFG failed in its promise to take whatever 
action was necessary to prevent adverse impacts on the existing domestic sheep operators. As 
the bighorns are property of the State of Idaho per Idaho Code § 36-1O-3(a), IDFG could itself 
have managed the bighorn sheep in a manner to reduce losses associated with domestic sheep. 
IDFG could have provided alternative grazing allotments. IDFG could have provided alternative 
sources of food for the domestic sheep. IDFG could have paid the Woolgrowers for the partial 
or total loss of their business occasioned by the reintroduction of the bighorn sheep. IDFG did 
none of these; it accordingly breached the contract memorialized in the 1997 Letter Agreement. 
Moreover, contrary to the district court's findings (R., p.183), nowhere in the four comers 
of the Letter Agreement is it suggested that "the Department [will only] be responsible for their 
own acts." The Letter Agreement encompasses the actions of the entire Hells Canyon Bighorn 
Restoration Committee which includes the Forest Service. The letter states that the Committee 
as a whole is interested in having the support of the Woolgrowers for the Committee's effort to 
repopulate Hells Canyon with bighorn sheep. The letter states that the Committee as a whole 
understands the impact the reintroduction will have on the domestic sheep operators. The letter 
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commits the state wildlife agencies, including specifically IDFG, to take whatever action is 
necessary to prevent any adverse impacts on the domestic sheep operators. 
Under the standards of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, by which all reasonable 
intendments should be made by the court to sustain the complaint, it appears undisputable that 
the Woolgrowers have stated a claim for relief and should be entitled to offer evidence as to the 
intentions of the parties to the 1997 agreement. The district court's dismissal of the contract 
claim on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is contrary to the applicable legal standards. 
C. The 1997 Agreement Is Not Void as a Matter of Law. 
The court below states in dicta that even if the Letter Agreement created an obligation on 
the part of IDFG, such a contract would be void because it would be an attempt to create 
indebtedness without proper appropriation. (R., p.183). The district court then states the 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not allege a specific legislative appropriation for the 
asserted liability. Again, the court appeared to have forgotten that it was considering a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and not deciding the case after a full blown evidentiary hearing. 
Rule 8(a)(1), I.R.C.P., requires only a "short and plain statement of the claims showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief." 
After reviewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of 
the non-moving party, the court will ask whether a claim for relief 
has been stated. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will 
ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer 
evidence to support the claims. 
Lasser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672-73,183 P.3d 758,760-61 (2008). 
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Questions of fact or questions of credibility are not to be decided at this time. The court 
must look no further than the pleadings. It must conclude that it is beyond doubt that the 
Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief 
before granting a motion to dismiss. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 895 P.2d 561 
(1995). 
Idaho Code § 59-1015 prohibits state employees or boards from entering into contracts or 
agreements creating expense or incurring any liability in excess of the appropriation made by 
law. Section 59-1016 says that any "indebtedness" attempted to be created in violation of the 
provisions of this Chapter is void. Both of these statutes implement the provisions of Idaho 
Constitution, Article VII, § 13 which prohibit the withdrawal of money from the State Treasury 
except in pursuance of appropriations made by law. 
First of all, in this early stage of litigation and on a motion to dismiss, there is no proof 
that the Idaho Legislature in its appropriations to the Department of Fish and Game in 1996 and 
1997 did not provide monies to the Department to aid in bighorn sheep restoration. Moreover, 
the appropriation power and these statutes apply only to money in the State Treasury. Article 
VII, § 13. For example, special custodial funds held in trust by the State are not subject to 
appropriation. State v. Musgrove, 84 Idaho 77,84-87,370 P.2d 778 (1962). Monies received by 
the agency from a federal source may not be subject to appropriation. 1982 Idaho Attorney 
General Opinion 97, 1912 WL156267 (Idaho.A.G.). Idaho Code § 36-108 provides for a Fish 
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and Game Expendable Account which may be used by IDFG in the public interest and in 
accordance with the policies set forth in the Fish & Game Code. See also Idaho Code § 36-111 
(Set Aside Account); Idaho Code § 36-112 (Animal Damage Control Fund); and § 36-115 (Big 
Game Depredation Fund); as well as Idaho Code § 36-110 (Federal Account). IDFG could have 
raised money through licensing, etc., sufficient to fund the amounts needed to protect the 
Woolgrowers without taking funds from the State Treasury. Indeed, Idaho Code § 36-408(5)(b) 
specifically provides for this. That section authorizes a lottery for a special bighorn sheep tag 
and states: 
Moneys in the [fish and game expendable trust account] from the 
lottery bighorn sheep tag shall be utilized by the department in 
solving problems between bighorn sheep and domestic sheep, 
solving problems between wildlife and domestic animals or 
improving relationship between sportsman and private landowners. 
Next, it could be that there was no expectation that an appropriation be made in 1997 
because in 1997 there was no way to know whether or not the introduction of the bighorn sheep 
would cause economic damages to the Woolgrowers or the extent of those damages or how those 
damages could be avoided. The 1996-1997 Legislature need not have appropriated money at 
that time. I Nor did the Letter Agreement necessarily obligate IDFG to withdraw money from the 
State Treasury as there are other options to protect the Woolgrowers from economic harm other 
than merely a monetary payout. IDFG could provide alternative grazing on State land, for 
example. 
I Moreover, § 59-1015 has an exception for cases of epidemic. As IDFO and the Forest Service claim that domestic 
sheep cause an epidemic among bighorn sheep (through some mechanism not yet identified), then perhaps this 
exception comes into play to take the matter out of the scope of the statute. 
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If the statutes invalidate the contractual obligations contained in the Letter Agreement, as 
contended by IDFG, then those statutes as applied violate the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions. Amendment 14 of the U.S. Constitution proscribes deprivation of property rights 
without due process. Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution denies states the power to impair 
contracts. The Idaho Constitution forbids the deprivation of property rights without due process 
of law, Article I, § 13, and Article I, § 16 provides that no law "impairing the obligation of 
contracts shall ever be passed." 
Furthermore, the case law interpreting Idaho Constitution Article VII, § 13 notes that no 
set form of words is necessary to make appropriation by the Legislature and if an appropriation is 
made payable from a specific fund (e.g., the IDFG budget), it is not necessary to appropriate a 
specific sum. Herrick v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 13,204 P. 477 (1922); State ex rel. Hansen v. Parsons, 
57 Idaho 775, 69 P.2d 788 (1937). 
This discussion, however, is premature and unnecessary at this stage. The issue before 
the district court was whether there was an agreement by which IDFG agreed to protect the 
Woolgrowers. It was not a question of the enforceability of a judgment. The legislature could 
appropriate monies in the next session if the agreement were found to be valid. But again, that is 
not an issue to be decided on a motion to dismiss. 
D. The Amended Complaint States a Valid Statutory Claim. 
Idaho Code § 36-106( e)( 5)(D) provides that it "is the policy of the state of Idaho that 
existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any bighorn sheep transplant or relocation 
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are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn 
sheep when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted." This provision 
is in the section creating the office of Director of the Department of Fish & Game and specifying 
the duties and powers of the director. The provision was enacted on March 24, 1997 and went 
into effect on that day as an emergency measure. Specifically, the amended portion provided: 
Upon any transplant of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now 
inhabit or a transplant to augment existing populations, the 
department shall provide for any affected federal or state land 
grazing permittees or owners or leaseholders of private land a 
written letter signed by all federal, state and private entities 
responsible for the transplant stating that the existing sheep or 
livestock operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep 
transplant are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of 
disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the same 
invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted. 
It is also important to note that the contact listed for the 1997 bill was Stan Boyd, Executive 
Director of the Idaho Wool Growers Association. 
Section 36-106 was amended in 2009 to include a new subsection, (e)(5)(E), which 
requires the IDFG to develop a State management plan to maintain the population of bighorn 
sheep "which shall consider as part of the plan the current federal or state domestic sheep grazing 
allotment(s) that currently have any bighorn sheep upon or in proximity to the allotment(s)," and 
also directed IDFG to "cooperatively develop best management practices with the permittee(s) 
on the allotment(s)." 
It is the Woolgrowers' contention, as supported by the legislative history, the context of 
the enactment and the plain language of the statute itself, that the Idaho legislature when 
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recognizing the "policy of the State of Idaho" that domestic existing sheep operations shall not 
be harmed by the reintroduction of bighorn sheep, mandated IDFG to protect domestic sheep 
operators from economic harm. It is apparent that IDFG has not done so. It is accordingly 
apparent that IDFG has not fulfilled its statutory duties as intended by the state legislature. It is 
clear that that breach of statutory duty is continuing even as of this date. This cause of action 
seeks a remedy for that continuing breach of statutory duty. 
It is the Woolgrowers' contention that Idaho Code § 36-106 should be read to authorize 
an award of damages against the State in the amount of the economic harm sustained by the 
Woolgrowers. That is the plain import of the provision enacted in 1997 when the initial bighorn 
reintroduction was about to commence. Certainly the legislature intended to protect the domestic 
sheep operators from all adverse consequences of that reintroduction effort. This interpretation 
will be verified by testimony of the relevant witnesses as well as the relevant legislative history. 
The Woolgrowers assert that even if it is determined that the statute does not explicitly 
authorize an award of monetary damages, the court can still find that the statute was violated and 
can require IDFG to provide non-monetary remedies to the Woolgrowers in the form of 
managing the bighorn sheep to reduce losses associated with domestic sheep, alternative 
domestic sheep grazing locations, feed for the domestic sheep or other arrangements which 
would protect their operations. 
The district court, however, interpreted the statute and the legislative history to conclude 
that the legislature did not intend to obligate the State to indemnify the Wool growers for any 
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activities related to the bighorn sheep reintroduction. The Woolgrowers assert that this action 
was improper on a motion to dismiss. They should have the right at trial or even on a motion for 
summary judgment to elicit evidence regarding legislative intent, as their Amended Complaint 
contains sufficient facts to support this statutory claim. 
E. The Woolgrowers Have Asserted a Viable Claim for Estoppel. 
The district court did not analyze the Woolgrowers' estoppel claims to any extent. 
Rather, it stated that the various theories of estoppel must fail based on its finding that the 1997 
Letter Agreement creates no enforceable contract. The court also stated that equitable estoppel 
cannot be applied against the State because it was not acting in a proprietary capacity, but rather 
a sovereign capacity, in dealing with the bighorn sheep reintroduction. If this Court finds that 
the district court should not have dismissed the contractual cause of action under the 12(b)(6) 
standards, then it should also resurrect the estoppel claims. The Woolgrowers also assert that 
even if the contractual cause of action is dismissed, it would not be appropriate to dismiss the 
estoppel causes of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as the Court must allow factfinding on the 
elements of the estoppel causes of action. 
In their Amended Complaint, the Wool growers set out the elements of estoppel which 
they assert apply to IDFG's failure to live up to the promises made to the Woolgrowers in 1997. 
That is all that is required to defeat a motion to dismiss before the parties have a chance to bring , 
to light the facts and the equities that apply to the situation. Instead of simply analyzing the 
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pleadings, as required in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court considered whether 
there were representations and looked at the factual background and weighed the equities of the 
situation. This is improper at this stage of the litigation. 
The district court did recognize that while generally estoppel cannot be applied to a 
governmental agency, the notions of justice and fair play may require the application of estoppel 
to an agency. Brandt v. State, 126 Idaho 101,878 P.2d 800 (Ct.App. 1994). The court then went 
on, however, to find there was no promise upon which the Woolgrowers could rely (R., p.191), 
no false representations by IDFG to the Woolgrowers (R., p.192), and no contrary position taken 
by IDFG (R., p.193). The Court also concluded that IDFG was acting in a sovereign capacity, 
and not engaging in a proprietary or commercial enterprise. (R., p. 194). 
While the Woolgrowers disagree with each of those findings, their primary response is 
that those issues are inappropriate for determination on a motion to dismiss. They are fact-
specific issues to be decided by the factfinder. The Complaint set out all of the elements of 
estoppel and a court may only consider the pleadings when deciding a motion to dismiss. 
If this Court considers the factual questions, the Woolgrowers assert that the 1997 Letter 
Agreement must be considered a "promise" by IDFG - a promise which caused the 
Woolgrowers to drop their opposition to the bighorn reintroduction. Why else was the letter sent 
to IWGA by the Idaho Fish and Game Department? Indeed, IDFG conceded for purposes of the 
12(b)(6) motion that there was indeed an agreement. 
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Similarly, it is a factual question whether IDFG made false representations to the 
Wool growers and then took a position contrary to what it had previously represented. Finally, 
how can a court determine whether IDFG was acting in a proprietary capacity without 
considering factual evidence? 
The Woolgrowers submit that IDFG was acting in a proprietary or commercial capacity 
when it was negotiating with the Woolgrowers about the reintroduction of bighorn sheep. IDFG 
was interested in bringing back bighorn sheep in the Hells Canyon area for tourism and hunting 
purposes and was willing and anxious to cut a deal with the Woolgrowers to convince the 
Woolgrowers to withdraw their opposition. The Woolgrowers made a business decision as well, 
agreeing to withdraw their opposition in return for a promise they would be protected 
economically by the IDFG. If IDFG had been acting in a sovereign/governmental capacity, it 
would have had no reason or necessity to cut a deal with individual commercial interests such as 
IWGA. If a State agency is acting in its sovereign capacity, it does not cut deals with those 
affected by its decisionmaking. Only when a State agency acts outside of its sovereign capacity 
must it strike deals with affected commercial interests. Thus, estoppel does apply here as IDFG 
was acting in a business and proprietary manner. See also Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. 
Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 138,997 P.2d 591,599 (2000) ("therefore, because the SIF is undisputedly 
a public agency acting in a proprietary capacity, the doctrine of equitable estoppel would 
normally be applicable to the SIF'). 
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Moreover, as the district court itself recognized, estoppel may be applied against the 
government even in its sovereign capacity under certain limited circumstances. Brandt v. State 
of Idaho, 126 Idaho 101, 878 P.2d 800 (Ct.App. 1994), noted that the control of penal institutions 
and parole are functions of the state as a sovereign and a claim of estoppel would ordinarily be 
precluded. The court went on: 
Brandt contends, however, that in some circumstances the 
government's conduct is such that estoppel does apply even when 
the government is acting as a sovereign. He refers us to Johnson v. 
Williford, 682 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.1982), where a convicted felon, 
sentenced to a term of ten years without possibility of parole, was 
mistakenly granted parole and lived at large for fifteen months. 
Despite his ineligibility, the prisoner in Johnson, was considered 
for parole on eight separate occasions and was eventually released 
on parole after a full hearing. When the mistake was discovered 
fifteen months later, the parole was revoked. The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the interests of justice and fair play 
required that the government be estopped from then denying the 
inmate's parole eligibility, stating: 
'[WJhere justice and fair play require it' estoppel will be applied 
against the government, even when the government acts in its 
sovereign capacity if the effects of estoppel do not unduly damage 
the public interest. 
Id. at 871 citing United States v. Lazy Fe Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 
989 (9th Cir.1973). See also United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 
406 (9th Cir.1975). 
We note that in addition to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
numerous other jurisdictions have allowed estoppel to be applied 
against the government in its sovereign capacity under limited 
circumstances. However, whatever merit there may be in this 
argument for application of estoppel against the government, we 
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may not address it here, for Brandt did not present this issue to the 
magistrate. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also suggested that equitable estoppel may be applied to 
prevent injustice: "This Court has held that the doctrine of estoppel may be used against a 
highway district to prevent it from taking a position inconsistent with previous actions, in order 
to prevent manifest injustice. Murtaugh Highway Dist. v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 65 Idaho 
260, 268, 142 P.2d 579-82 (1943)." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Ind. Hwy. Dist., 126 Idaho 
145, 151, 879 P.2d 1078, 1084 (1994). 
F. The Woolgrowers Are Entitled to an Award of Attorneys' Fees. 
The Woolgrowers assert that they are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under Idaho 
Code § 12-117. That section provides that attorneys' fees may be awarded against a state agency 
which acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The Woolgrowers assert that the State's 
motion is not supported by fact or law and the IDFG has acted unreasonably in trying to escape 
its contractual and equitable obligations. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The issue before this Court is not whether the Wool growers will ultimately prevail, but 
whether they should be entitled to offer evidence to support their claims. See Orthman, 126 
Idaho at 962, 895 P.3d at 563. The district court failed to follow the standards for deciding a 
motion to dismiss and went far beyond the pleadings. 
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The Woolgrowers respectfully request this Court to reverse the district court's Judgment 
dismissing Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(d)(b)(6) and remand the case for trial. 
DATED this Z, I day of September, 2011. 
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